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_ 
 
OPINION 
_ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Federal law prohibits the possession of firearms by 
anyone who has previously been adjudicated as mentally ill or 
committed to a mental institution.  Bradley Beers challenges 
this law on the ground that, as applied to him, it violates the 
Second Amendment.   
 
Mentally ill individuals have traditionally been 
prohibited from possessing guns because they were considered 
to be a danger to themselves and to others.  Beers cannot 
factually distinguish himself from this historically-barred class 
because a court has determined that Beers was a danger to 
himself and thereby required that he be committed to a mental 
institution.  Beers contends, however, that, although he was 
previously involuntarily institutionalized, he has since been 
rehabilitated.  For this reason, he argues that his rehabilitation 
distinguishes his circumstances from those in the historically-
barred class.   
 
The issue that we must consider then is whether passage 
of time and evidence of rehabilitation are relevant to our 
inquiry concerning the constitutionality of the prohibition of 
the possession of firearms by Beers. 
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BACKGROUND 
 Beers was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric 
inpatient hospital on December 28, 2005, after he told his 
mother that he was suicidal and put a gun in his mouth.  Beers’s 
mother was particularly concerned because Beers kept a gun in 
his room and had the means to kill himself.  Beers was 
involuntarily admitted to the hospital for up to 120 hours 
pursuant to Section 302 of Pennsylvania’s Mental Health 
Procedures Act (MHPA).1  The examining physician 
determined that Beers was suicidal and that inpatient treatment 
was required for his safety.   
 
On December 29, 2005, and again on January 3, 2006, 
a Pennsylvania court extended Beers’s involuntary 
commitment pursuant to Sections 303 and 304 of the MHPA, 
concluding that he presented a danger to himself or to others.2  
At the court hearings for the extensions, the Bucks County 
                                              
1 50 Pa. C.S. § 7302 (“Emergency examination may be 
undertaken at a treatment facility upon the certification of a 
physician stating the need for such examination . . ..”). 
2 See 50 Pa. C.S. § 7303(a) (“Application for extended 
involuntary emergency treatment may be made for any person 
who is being treated pursuant to section 302 whenever the 
facility determines that the need for emergency treatment is 
likely to extend beyond 120 hours.”); id. § 7304(a)(2) (“Where 
a petition is filed for a person already subject to involuntary 
treatment, it shall be sufficient to represent, and upon hearing 
to reestablish . . . that his condition continues to evidence a 
clear and present danger to himself or others . . . ..” (emphasis 
added)). 
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Court of Common Pleas determined that Beers was “severely 
mentally disabled and in need of treatment.”3 
Beers has had no mental health treatment since 2006.  A 
physician who examined Beers in 2013 opined that Beers was 
able “to safely handle firearms again without risk of harm to 
himself or others.”4  Shortly after he was discharged from his 
commitment in 2006, Beers attempted to buy a firearm but was 
denied because a background check revealed that he had been 
involuntarily committed to a mental institution.   
 
Beers subsequently filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4),5 the federal statute 
prohibiting him from possessing a gun, was unconstitutional as 
applied to him.6  The government moved to dismiss the 
complaint.   
 
Applying the two-part test derived from our rulings in 
United States v. Marzzarella7 and Binderup v. Attorney 
General,8 the District Court first determined that Beers could 
                                              
3 App. 8-9; Supp. App. 9-10. 
4 App. 10. 
5 “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed 
to a mental institution . . . to . . . possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 
6 Beers also asserted due process and equal protection 
violations.  These claims were not raised on appeal. 
7 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
8 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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not distinguish his circumstances from those of mentally ill 
individuals who were subject to the longstanding prohibitions 
on firearm possession.  The court next held that, pursuant to 
our ruling in Binderup, evidence of Beers’s rehabilitation was 
irrelevant; thus, Beers could not rely on such evidence to 
distinguish his circumstances.  As a result, the court ruled that 
§ 922(g)(4) did not impose a burden on conduct falling within 
the scope of the Second Amendment and was therefore 
constitutional as applied to Beers.  The District Court 
dismissed Beers’s complaint.  Beers appeals the District 
Court’s rejection of his as-applied Second Amendment 
challenge to § 922(g)(4).9 
 
DISCUSSION10 
 
I. The Framework for Second Amendment Challenges 
 
 When a challenge is made to a law prohibiting the 
possession of firearms, we follow our rulings in Marzzarella 
and Binderup.  Pursuant to these cases, we are required to 
                                              
9 While the government’s motion to dismiss Beers’s complaint 
in the District Court was still pending, a Pennsylvania court 
restored Beers’s state law right to possess a firearm, pursuant 
to 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(f), which allows the restoration of state 
gun ownership rights.  Because § 6105(f) does not satisfy 
federal requirements allowing for acknowledgement by the 
federal government of the state’s restoration of gun rights, 
Beers remains subject to the prohibition of § 922(g)(4).  See 
Pub. L. No. 110-180 § 105, 121 Stat. 2559, 2569-70 (2008). 
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
2201, 2202, and 2412, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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conduct a two-part inquiry.  First, we look at the historic, 
traditional justifications for barring a class of individuals from 
possessing guns and ask whether the challenger can distinguish 
his circumstances from those of individuals in the historically-
barred class.  If the challenger makes such a showing, we 
proceed to the second step, which requires the government to 
demonstrate that the challenged law satisfies some form of 
heightened scrutiny.   
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller 
 
Our jurisprudence in Second Amendment cases is based 
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.11  The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”12  Heller involved a challenge to a District of 
Columbia law that banned handgun possession, including the 
possession of handguns in the home.  The Supreme Court held 
in Heller that the Second Amendment guarantees to an 
individual the right – not unlimited – to keep and bear arms.13  
The Court recognized that “[a]t the ‘core’ of the Second 
Amendment is the right of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”14  Because the 
District of Columbia law in question violated this core Second 
Amendment right, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional.   
                                              
11 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
12 U.S. CONST. amend. II.   
13 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
14 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 343 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-
35). 
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However, in articulating the guarantee to keep and bear 
arms, the Supreme Court recognized that “the right was not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”15  Indeed, nothing in 
Heller, according to the Court, “should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill.”16  The Court therefore identified 
such prohibitions as “presumptively lawful,” because they 
affect classes of individuals who, historically, have not had the 
right to keep and bear arms.17  
 
B. The Third Circuit’s Two-Part Test for 
Analyzing Second Amendment Challenges  
 
Our first occasion after Heller to decide a Second 
Amendment challenge involved a statute prohibiting the 
possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers.  In 
Marzzarella, we applied a two-part test for evaluating Second 
Amendment challenges:  “First, we ask whether the challenged 
law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of 
                                              
15 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 627 n.26; see also Binderup, 836 F.3d at 343 (“These 
measures comport with the Second Amendment because they 
affect individuals or conduct unprotected by the right to keep 
and bear arms.” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 631, 635)); United 
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (list of 
presumptively lawful regulations reflects historical 
understanding of Second Amendment right), overruled on 
other grounds by Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349, 350. 
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the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”18  If it does not, we need 
not proceed to 
the second step.  If it does, however, we assess the law under 
heightened scrutiny.19  Where the law survives heightened 
scrutiny, it is constitutional; if not, it is invalid.20  In 
Marzzarella, we held that even if the law did impose a burden 
on protected conduct, in view of the government’s interest in 
tracing weapons through serial numbers, the law survived 
intermediate scrutiny.21 
 
A year later, in United States v. Barton, we heard a 
challenge to 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1), the federal statute banning 
felons from gun possession.22  In Barton, we determined that, 
even though felon dispossession statutes were presumptively 
lawful under Heller, § 922(g)(1) could still be challenged as it 
applied to individuals.23  In evaluating such a challenge, we 
                                              
18 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
19 The Heller Court stopped short of announcing the level of 
scrutiny that applies when a law infringes on Second 
Amendment rights.  It cautioned nevertheless that rational 
basis review would not suffice.  544 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all 
that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms 
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment . . . would have 
no effect.”). 
20 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
21 Id. at 95, 98-99. 
22 633 F.3d at 173-75.  In Barton, we also denied the 
challenger’s facial attack of the statute “because Heller 
requires that we ‘presume,’ under most circumstances, that 
felon dispossession statutes regulate conduct which is 
unprotected by the Second Amendment.”  Id. at 172. 
23 Id. at 173. 
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turned to the traditional justifications underlying the § 
922(g)(1) ban on gun possession by felons to determine 
whether these justifications supported permanent 
disarmament.  This review was informed by the historical 
approach the Court applied in Heller.  There, the Court 
explained that it would “expound upon the historical 
justifications for” presumptively lawful regulations “if and 
when those [regulations] come before [it].”24 
 
In Barton, our historical review informed us that, 
traditionally, individuals who committed violent offenses were 
barred from gun possession; “the common law right to keep 
and bear arms did not extend to this group.”25  We then held 
that to successfully raise an as-applied challenge, the 
challenger had to distinguish his circumstances from those of 
persons historically-barred from possession of a firearm by 
demonstrating either (1) that he was convicted of a minor, non-
violent crime and thus “he is no more dangerous than a typical 
law-abiding citizen”; or (2) that a significant time has passed 
so that he has been “rehabilitated” and “poses no continuing 
threat to society.”26  Applying this standard, we concluded that 
the challenger failed to distinguish his circumstances, which 
included prior convictions for possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute and for receipt of a stolen firearm.27  As a result, 
we held that the statute was constitutional as applied to him.28 
 
                                              
24 Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 174. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 175. 
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Five years after Barton, in Binderup, we decided 
another as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), this time by two 
individuals, Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez, seeking to 
distinguish themselves from the historically-barred class of 
felons.  Many years earlier, the challengers had been convicted 
of potentially serious offenses, defined by the state as 
misdemeanors.  They had since led lives free of criminal 
convictions, except for Suarez who had one conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol.29  We were tasked with 
determining whether § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as 
applied to the challengers, given their “rehabilitation” after the 
offenses they had committed.   
 
In deciding the as-applied challenge, we clarified the 
applicable test.  We explained that, at step one of Marzzarella, 
a challenger “must (1) identify the traditional justifications for 
excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of 
which he appears to be a member, and then (2) present facts 
about himself and his background that distinguish his 
circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred 
class.”30  If a challenger passes these two hurdles, “the burden 
shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the regulation 
satisfies some form of heightened scrutiny . . . at step two of 
the Marzzarella analysis.”31 
 
In making this clarification, we overruled Barton 
insofar as, at the first step, it allowed a challenger to distinguish 
himself from a historically-barred class by demonstrating the 
                                              
29 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340. 
30 Id. at 346-47 (internal citations omitted). 
31 Id. at 347. 
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passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation.32  As we noted in 
Binderup, the historical justification for disarming felons was 
that they were “unvirtuous,” a term historically applied to 
individuals who had committed “serious” crimes.33  Where the 
historical justification for disarming felons was because they 
had committed serious crimes, risk of violent recidivism was 
irrelevant, “and the seriousness of the purportedly 
disqualifying offense is our sole focus throughout 
Marzzarella’s first step.”34  We therefore emphasized that 
neither passage of time nor evidence of rehabilitation “can 
restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited.”35  After 
Binderup, the only way a felon can distinguish himself from 
the historically-barred class of individuals who have been 
convicted of serious crimes is by demonstrating that his 
conviction was for a non-serious crime, i.e., that he is literally 
not a part of the historically-barred class.36 
 
Three factors supported our conclusion that Barton’s 
emphasis on rehabilitation evidence was misplaced.  First, 
there was no historical support for the proposition that Second 
Amendment rights could be restored after they were forfeited, 
and historical context was the guiding principle for our Second 
Amendment analysis.37  Second, to the extent such a 
restoration remedy was available, it was a matter of 
                                              
32 Id. at 349. 
33 Id. at 348. 
34 Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 349-50 
37 Id. at 350. 
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congressional grace.38  Third, and most importantly, we held 
that courts are “not ‘institutionally equipped’ to conduct ‘a 
                                              
38 Id.  As Judge Fuentes explained in his concurrence, by a 
separate provision of the federal gun laws, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), 
Congress provided an opportunity for individuals who were 
prohibited from possessing guns to apply to the Attorney 
General for “relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal 
laws.”  Id. at 402.  The Attorney General was given the power 
to “grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that 
the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s 
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be 
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety . . ..”  18 
U.S.C. § 925(c).  Pursuant to the statute, an applicant who is 
denied relief by the Attorney General may petition a district 
court for relief. 
This relief provision, however, has been “rendered 
inoperative” because Congress defunded this program in 1992, 
and an “embargo on funds has remained in place ever since.”  
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 402-03 (Fuentes, J., concurring).  
“Congress effectively wr[ote] § 925(c) out of the statute 
books” because it concluded that the task of granting individual 
applications was “a very difficult and subjective task which 
could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if 
the wrong decision is made.”  Id. at 403 (quoting S. Rep. No. 
102-353, at 19).  A House report also stated that “too many of 
these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on 
to commit violent crimes with firearms.”  Id. (citing H.R. Rep. 
No. 104-183, at 15).  Congress therefore concluded that a 
system for restoring gun rights was unworkable.  Id.   
14 
 
neutral, wide-ranging investigation’ into post-conviction 
assertions of rehabilitation.”39   
 
II. Whether § 922(g)(4) Burdens Conduct Falling 
Within the Scope of the Second Amendment 
 
 Turning to the case before us and the constitutionality 
of § 922(g)(4) as applied to Beers, Marzzarella and Binderup 
require Beers to demonstrate that this statute burdens conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment.  To do so, he must “(1) 
identify the traditional justifications for excluding from Second 
Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a 
member, and then (2) present facts about himself and his 
                                              
39 Id. at 350 (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 
(2002)).  After Congress defunded the § 925(c) restoration 
program described above, individuals barred from possessing 
firearms under federal law began filing suits asking federal 
district courts to review their restoration applications in the 
first instance.  We ruled in Pontarelli v. United States 
Department of Treasury that Congress’s denial of funds to 
process § 925(c) restoration applications stripped the federal 
district courts of jurisdiction to review the Justice 
Department’s refusal to act on those applications.  285 F.3d 
216, 230 (3d Cir. 2002).  We also noted the institutional 
limitations and lack of resources of federal courts to conduct 
detailed investigations of applicants’ backgrounds and their 
recent conduct.  Id. at 230-31.  The Supreme Court later 
confirmed this understanding in holding that the § 925(c) 
“inquiry into [an] applicant’s background [is] a function best 
performed by the Executive, which, unlike courts, is 
institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral, wide-ranging 
investigation.”  Bean, 537 U.S. at 77.  
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background that distinguish his circumstances from those of 
persons in the historically barred class.”40   
 
Beers has not been able to do so.  Even though he claims 
to be rehabilitated, Beers cannot distinguish himself from the 
historically-barred class of mentally ill individuals who were 
excluded from Second Amendment protection because of the 
danger they had posed to themselves and to others.   
 
Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of firearms 
by anyone “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or 
who has been committed to a mental institution.”  The Code of 
Federal Regulations defines “adjudicated as a mental 
defective” to include, among other definitions, “[a] 
determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful 
authority that a person, as a result of . . . mental illness . . . [i]s 
a danger to himself or to others . . ..”41  The Code defines 
“committed to a mental institution” as a “[f]ormal commitment 
of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, 
commission, or other lawful authority,” including 
“commitment to a mental institution involuntarily” and 
“commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness.”42  
Because the Code has defined the terms employed in § 
922(g)(4) and because Beers was committed involuntarily by 
the Pennsylvania court to a psychiatric hospital in conformity 
with 27 CFR § 478.11 and with 50 Pa. C.S. §§ 7302-7304, we 
conclude that Beers has properly been identified as a member 
of the class described in § 922(g)(4).  
                                              
40 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346-47 (internal citations omitted). 
41 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. 
42 Id. 
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To support our conclusion, we will review the 
traditional justifications for prohibiting the mentally ill from 
possessing guns in order to consider then if the imposition of 
the § 922(g)(4) ban is justified. 
 
A. The Traditional Justifications for Excluding 
Mentally Ill Individuals from Second 
Amendment Protections 
 
Traditionally, individuals who were considered 
dangerous to the public or to themselves were outside of the 
scope of Second Amendment protection.  Although laws 
specifically excluding the mentally ill from firearm possession 
did not begin appearing until later, such laws were not 
necessary during the eighteenth century.43  At that time, 
judicial officials were authorized to “lock up” so-called 
“lunatics” or other individuals with dangerous mental 
impairments.44  Thus, courts analyzing the traditional 
justifications for disarming the mentally ill have noted that “if 
taking away a lunatic’s liberty was permissible, then we should 
                                              
43 See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A 
Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 13773 (2009).   
The tools of deduction employed here to conclude that 
the mentally ill were historically-barred from gun ownership, 
where there is little evidence of specific historic prohibitions, 
are the same means we employed in Binderup.  Indeed, laws 
prohibiting felons from gun possession were also relatively 
new.  See Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.  
44 Larson, supra note 43, at 1377-78 (citations omitted). 
17 
 
find the ‘lesser intrusion’ of taking his or her firearms was also 
permissible.”45  
 
The historical record cited in Binderup supports this 
conclusion.  In Binderup, we turned to the precursor to the 
Second Amendment, the Address and Reasons of Dissent of 
the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to 
Their Constituents.  That Address states that citizens did not 
have a right to bear arms if they had committed a crime.  The 
Address goes on to note that citizens were excluded from the 
right to bear arms if they were a “real danger of public 
injury.”46  We can therefore ascertain that the traditional 
justification for disarming mentally ill individuals was that 
they were considered dangerous to themselves and/or to the 
public at large.    
 
B. Beers’s Circumstances 
Having identified the traditional justification for 
denying the mentally ill the right to arms—that they present a 
danger to themselves or to others—we now ask whether Beers 
has presented sufficient facts to distinguish his circumstances 
from those of members in this historically-barred class.47  
Beers’s only bases for distinguishing himself, however, are 
that a substantial amount of time has passed since he was 
institutionalized and that he is now rehabilitated.    
                                              
45 Jefferies v. Sessions, 278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 841 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (quoting Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (M.D. 
Pa. 2016)). 
46 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349 (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 662, 665 (1971)). 
47 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349. 
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We established in Binderup that neither passage of time 
nor evidence of rehabilitation “can restore Second Amendment 
rights that were forfeited.”48  There was no historical support 
for the proposition that forfeited rights could be restored.49 
 
In Binderup, we held that a challenger to § 922(g)(1) 
could distinguish his circumstances only by demonstrating that 
he was not convicted of a serious crime, but not by 
demonstrating that he had reformed or been rehabilitated.  We 
reached this conclusion after analyzing the historical 
underpinnings of such a ban, which indicated that individuals 
who had committed serious crimes were traditionally 
prohibited from gun possession.  Because the challengers in 
Binderup had not committed serious crimes, a ban on their 
right to bear arms was unconstitutional as it applied to them.  
Passage of time and evidence of rehabilitation, however, had 
no bearing on whether the challengers were convicted of 
serious crimes.  Such evidence, therefore, was irrelevant in our 
analysis at step one.    
 
Here, the historical underpinnings of § 922(g)(4) were 
to keep guns from individuals who posed a danger to 
                                              
48 Id. at 350 
49 Id. 
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themselves or to others.50  Beers was committed to a mental 
institution for this very reason:  he was suicidal, and a court 
determined that he was a danger to himself or to others.  The 
doctor who examined Beers noted that inpatient treatment was 
needed for Beers’s safety.  Additionally, Pennsylvania courts 
extended Beers’s involuntary commitment on two occasions. 
 
Beers cannot distinguish his circumstances by arguing 
that he is no longer a danger to himself or to others.  
Acceptance of his argument would sidestep the ruling we made 
in Binderup that neither passage of time nor evidence of 
rehabilitation “can restore Second Amendment rights that were 
forfeited.”51  Instead, the only way Beers can distinguish his 
circumstances is by demonstrating that he was never 
determined to be a danger to himself or to others.  This Beers 
cannot do. 
Moreover, the reasons that justified disregarding 
passage of time or rehabilitation in Binderup apply here with 
                                              
50 In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the Sixth 
Circuit reached the opposite result to the one we reach here, 
concluding that § 922(g)(4) burdened the Second Amendment 
rights of the challenger, an individual who was also 
involuntarily committed because of the danger he posed to 
himself or to others.  837 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc).  In reaching that conclusion, the Sixth Circuit found 
lacking the historical support for prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by the mentally ill.  Id. at 689-90.  For the reasons 
we have stated above, we disagree that there is an absence of 
historical evidence that mentally ill individuals, who were 
considered a danger to themselves or to others, were banned 
from possessing guns. 
51 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350. 
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equal force.  First, there is no historical support for such 
restoration of Second Amendment rights.  In addition, as was 
the case in Binderup, federal courts are ill-equipped to 
determine whether any particular individual who was 
previously deemed mentally ill should have his or her firearm 
rights restored.52     
 
Because Beers cannot distinguish his circumstances, we 
conclude that § 922(g)(4) as applied to him does not burden 
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.53   
 
Nothing in our opinion should be read as perpetuating 
the stigma surrounding mental illness.  Although Beers may 
now be rehabilitated, we do not consider this fact in the context 
of the very circumscribed, historical inquiry we must conduct 
at step one.  Historically, our forebearers saw a danger in 
providing mentally ill individuals the right to possess guns.  
That understanding requires us to conclude that § 922(g)(4) is 
constitutional as applied to Beers. 
                                              
52 Id.  See supra n.39.  We realize that state courts participate 
in the involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are 
a danger to themselves or to others, see, e.g., 50 Pa. C.S. § 
7302.  The federal courts do not, however, participate in such 
commitments, nor do they have the resources to conduct 
detailed investigations of an individual’s mental state or his 
recent conduct.  Cf. Pontarelli, 285 F.3d at 230-31 (holding 
that, in regard to restoration of gun right to felons, federal 
courts lack resources to conduct detailed investigations of 
applicants’ background and their recent conduct.)   
53 Beers therefore fails to surpass the first step of our Second 
Amendment framework, and we need not proceed to step two.   
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
